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Explaining and predicting 
behavior involves understanding 
others in terms of their mental 
states —  the so-called Theory of 
Mind (ToM). It also involves the 
capacity to understand others 
in terms of culturally transmitted 
information about group 
membership, for example, which 
social groups exist in one’s culture 
and which stereotypes adhere 
to these groups. This capacity 
typically emerges between 3 
and 5 years of age, just like ToM 
understanding [1,2]. Are the 
cognitive capacities underlying 
ToM and stereotypes the same 
or do they provide independent 
means of understanding and 
predicting the actions of others? 
Children with autism have a 
profound inability to engage in 
everyday social interaction, as 
well as impairments in verbal and 
nonverbal communication, which 
have been attributed to a severe 
delay in ToM development [3,4]. If 
the use of stereotypes and mental states were part and parcel of 
the same underlying cognitive 
process [5], then autistic children 
should have similar difficulties 
with both. We report here that 
8-year-old autistic children with 
a mental age of 7, who fail ToM 
tasks, nevertheless know and 
use gender and race stereotypes 
just like normal children. This 
provides a powerful argument 
for the assumption of distinct 
processes in social reasoning [6] 
(see Supplemental data).
We assessed race and gender 
stereotype knowledge with 
the Preschool Racial Attitudes 
Measure (PRAM II) [7], which 
presents scenarios with outline 
drawings using a forced-choice 
format as shown in Figure 1. We 
also assessed the propensity 
to avoid the use of stereotypes 
in predicting a protagonist’s 
behaviour by devising a novel 
Conflict task. Here, the child was 
presented with vignettes where 
one prediction could be made 
from an individual’s current mental 
state or habitual preference, 
while a different prediction could 
be made from his or her social 
category membership. The mental 
state used was desire expressed 
as ‘likes to’, as it is virtually the 
first mental state that children 
understand [2]. We confirmed 
in a simple screening test that 
even our youngest and least able 
participants were able to grasp PRAM – race trial 
‘Here are two girls. One of them is a 
friendly girl. She has lots of friends. 
Which one is the friendly girl?’ 
Conflict task – race trial 
‘Here are two women. This is 
Georgina (left) and this is Chloe.
Georgina likes to help people. One of 
these women walked an old lady 
across the road. Which woman was it?’
PRAM – gender trial 
‘Here are two children. One of them 
has four dolls. Which one has four
dolls?’ 
Conflict task – gender trial 
‘Here are two people. This is James 
and this is Grace. Grace doesn’t like 
to cook for people. One of these 
people has baked biscuits. Which 
person baked biscuits?’
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Figure 1. Examples of race and gender trials for each task.
The child sees a picture — life-like coloured line drawings of people with brown or pink 
skin — and hears a short vignette. In total, each child completed 24 race and 12 gender 
trials on the PRAM and 5 race and 5 gender trials on the Conflict task; in the latter task, 
different predictions can be made on the basis of stereotypes or desires.
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Figure 2. Contrast of PRAM 
and Conflict tasks.
Percentage of stereotype-
consistent responses on 
the PRAM contrasted with 
the Conflict task, showing 
a significant task by group 
interaction (F(3,41) = 3.36, p = 
0.028) as well as a main ef-
fect of task (F(1,41) = 155.73, 
p < 0.001). The normally devel-
oping participants consisted 
of 3 year-olds (n = 17) and 7 
year-olds (n = 11); the latter 
are known to pass standard 
ToM tasks while the former 
are known to fail them [10]. 
5–11 year-olds with autism 
were divided into those who 
failed (n = 10; age 8 years) 
at least one of two well-
 established ToM tests [3,11] 
and those who passed both 
tests (n = 11; age 9 years). The 
verbal mental age [12] of the 
normally developing 7 year-olds, autistic ToM-failers and autistic ToM-passers was similar 
(7y 3m, 6y 8m, 7y 10m) while verbal IQ was lower for the autistic groups (106, 91, 88).the meaning of “he/she likes to do 
something”.
The findings are presented 
in Figure 2 and are striking on 
several counts. First, we consider 
performance on the PRAM test. 
Here, failure in mental state 
reasoning did not significantly 
affect children’s use of common 
social stereotypes. This is 
surprising, because the lack 
of social orientation in young 
children with autism must limit 
learning about kinds of people 
from implicit cultural cues [8]. 
In view of these difficulties, their 
fluent knowledge of race and 
gender stereotypes is astonishing. 
As with normally developing 
3-year olds, they could readily 
recruit this knowledge in a picture 
book context to predict and 
explain the protagonists’ behavior. 
The difficulties autistic children 
have with social communication 
in general and mental state 
reasoning in particular, did not 
hamper their acquisition of 
culturally transmitted knowledge 
about stereotypes. However 
this knowledge is acquired, 
the learning process must be 
remarkably robust if it works in 
early childhood, when social 
experience is limited, and in 
autism, when social experience is 
abnormal.
How are pernicious stereotypes 
overcome in normal development? Performance on the Conflict 
task suggests that mental-state 
reasoning may play a role in this. 
We were able to test this prediction 
by comparing autistic children 
who failed ToM tasks with those 
who passed these tasks and 
therefore were better able to predict 
protagonists’ behavior on the basis 
of their mental state. These children 
turned out to strongly prefer mental 
state reasoning over stereotypical 
group-based reasoning, using the 
latter only 20% of the time when 
one was pitted against the other. 
Their performance was like that of 
normally developing 7-year olds, 
but unlike that of other autistic 
children who had weaker ToM 
ability and predicted behavior as 
often in line with group stereotypes 
as in line with the protagonist’s 
desire or habitual preference. Still 
this indicates a less pronounced 
choice of stereotypic responses 
compared to the PRAM, consistent 
with a degree of understanding 
of mental states. Three-year-old, 
normally developing children also 
showed this pattern. 
Does group-based social 
reasoning function well also in 
adults with autism? A recent study 
[9] with high-functioning adults 
with autistic disorder suggests that 
this is the case. In this study the 
ability to attribute stereotypic traits 
to photographs of people, such as 
trustworthiness and status, was found to be intact. Taken together, 
these results suggest that there are 
important aspects of social ability in 
autism, suggesting strengths rather 
than weaknesses, which are as yet 
unexplored. 
Supplemental data
Supplemental data, including 
 experimental procedures are available at 
http://www.current-biology.com/cgi/con-
tent/full/17/12/R451/DC1
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